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Yashma Ransomware, Tracing the Chaos Family Tree

Update 05.27.22: An unknown APT group is targeting Russian government entities with at least four separate spear-phishing campaigns since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict. Source: Security Affairs.

It’s not often that we get to observe the behind-the-scenes drama that can accompany the creation of new malware, but when we do, it gives us a fascinating glimpse into how threat actors operate. One such glimpse, stemming from an online exchange between a ransomware perpetrator and a victim, gave us new insights into the origins of Chaos malware, revealing a twisted family tree that links it to both Onyx and Yashma ransomware variants.

The clues surfaced during a discussion between a recent victim and the threat group behind Onyx ransomware, taking place on the threat actor’s leak site. Someone claiming to be the creator of the Chaos ransomware builder’s kit joined the conversation, and revealed that Onyx was constructed from the author’s own Chaos v4.0 Ransomware Builder. The author went on to promote the most current version of the Chaos ransomware line, now renamed “Yashma.”

The Chaos author’s apparent intent of “outing” Onyx as a copycat is particularly ironic, given the origins of Chaos; that threat’s first incarnation sought to steal thunder from Ryuk ransomware by touting itself as a .NET version of Ryuk, complete with Ryuk branding on its graphical user interface (GUI). But the response to this ham-handed tactic was so negative, it prompted the threat’s creator to drop the Ryuk pretense and quickly rebrand its new creation as “Chaos.”

Figure 1: Screen capture of the chat on the Onxy ransomware leak site, showing comments by a person claiming to be the creator of Chaos malware

Operating System

Risk & Impact

Technical Analysis

Though Chaos ransomware builder has only been in the wild for a year, Yashma claims to be the sixth version (v6.0) of this malware. The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence team has observed a lateral progression throughout each iteration, from its first – dubbed “Ryuk .NET Builder” (Chaos v1.0) – to its latest, “Yashma Ransomware Builder” (Chaos v6.0).

The diagram in Figure 2 below provides a timeline of the malware builder’s development over the last twelve months, highlighting characteristics and advances the malware has made in this short time span.

Figure 2: Timeline of Chaos/ Yashma malware

Chaos v1.0

The first version of Chaos ransomware was initially dubbed “Ryuk .Net Ransomware Builder v1.0.” This threat was promoted on dark web forums as early as June 2021, claiming to be a .NET-compiled builder for the infamous ransomware family Ryuk, as seen in Figure 3.

The file was a basic .NET console that allowed malware operators to generate a sample of the threat that would go on to be known as Chaos ransomware. It also provided them with the ability to create a customized ransom note.

Figure 3: Ryuk .NET (Chaos) Ransomware Builder v1.0 panel

By claiming to be Ryuk, the dark web promotion of this builder sparked much analysis and research activity by the wider cybersecurity and reverse-engineering communities. However, no concrete links were found with the real Ryuk ransomware, or with the Wizard Spider group that created the infamous threat. It appears likely that the author was a “pretender to the throne,” attempting to cash in on the ransomware’s notoriety by piggybacking off the Ryuk name.

While this attempt to ride Ryuk’s coat tails did generate a lot of attention for the builder, it was resoundingly negative. Users of many dark web forums called out the creator for this deceptive naming. Some of this negative publicity must have stuck with the author, as within a few weeks, the builder was rebranded as Chaos, and quickly followed by the release of Chaos V2.0 and Chaos V3.0.

The new malware generated by this initial “ransomware builder” was quite basic, and it lacked a lot of functionality expected from a typical piece of ransomware. As a result, this threat unintentionally performed more like a destructor or wiper.

Malware generated within the builder could perform the following simple functions:

  • Randomize the file-extension of affected files (default: [a-z A-Z 0-9]{4})
  • Copy itself to a given process name (default: svchost.exe) in %AppData%
  • Create a .LNK file in the victim’s Startup folder
  • Add RegKey to the following location:
    • SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\Run
    • Key: Microsoft Store
    • Value: %Current Path/Location%
  • Attempt to spread itself via any connected USB drive.
  • Perform a sleep function/delay feature.

The malware would only target the victim’s C:\ drive, looking for files located in the following folders:

  • Desktop
  • Links
  • Saved Games
  • Contacts
  • Documents
  • Favorites
  • Downloads
  • Pictures
  • Searches
  • Music
  • One Drive
  • Videos

Although otherwise basic, Chaos-spawned malware had over a hundred targeted file-extensions that it would attempt to encrypt. Additionally, the malware had a list of files it would avoid targeting, including .DLL, .EXE, .LNK and .INI. These exclusions were likely there to prevent crashing the victim’s device by encrypting necessary system files.

This initial edition of Chaos overwrites the targeted file with a randomized Base64 string, rather than truly encrypting the file. Because the original contents of the files are lost during this process (seen in Figure 4), recovery is not possible, thus making Chaos a wiper rather than true ransomware.

This is unlike the real Ryuk’s encryption process, which uses AES/RSA-256 encryption.

Figure 4: Chaos v1.0/Ryuk .NET Builder encryption routine

In each folder affected by Chaos, the malware drops the ransom note as “read_it.txt.” This option is highly customizable within all iterations of the builder, giving malware operators the ability to include any text they want as the ransom note. In all versions of Chaos Ransomware Builder, the default note stays relatively unchanged, and it includes references to the Bitcoin wallet of the apparent creator of this threat.

Chaos v2.0 – v3.0

After the rebrand of Chaos malware took place, the second version of the malware was more refined than its initial iteration. This version included more advanced options, which one expects to see in more developed threats, as seen in Figure 5. It also (deceptively) continues to call itself ransomware, although the actual functionality remained that of a file-wiper.

Figure 5: Builders for Chaos v2.0 and Chaos v3.0

The second iteration of Chaos had additional functionality, generating more advanced ransomware samples that could perform the following activities:

  • Delete shadow copies
  • Delete backup catalogs
  • Disable Windows recovery mode

Figure 6: Chaos v2.0 file recovery disruption

Though Chaos v2.0 added these abilities to disrupt file recovery systems, the threat was still built on top of Chaos v1.0/Ryuk .NET Builder. This left its core encryption functionality unchanged, using the same encryption routine, as shown in Figure 4.

This means the malware was effectively still a destructor rather than actual ransomware, and there could be no attempt on the operator’s part to provide file recovery for a victim, even if the ransom was paid. Ironically, the author of Chaos v2.0 even mentions this in the “About” section of the builder, as shown below in Figure 7. In fact, the author points out the lack of functionality, citing the malware’s subsequent speed of operation as a selling point. (It is perhaps not surprising to note that the process of destroying files is twice as fast as it is to encrypt them.)

Figure 7: Chaos Builder v2.0 “About” section

Less than a month later, Chaos v3.0 was released, which finally had the ability to encrypt files. This meant the author could also create a decryptor to recover affected files.

Though this behavior was now more in line with the actions of traditional ransomware, the Chaos v3.0 builder could still only handle the encryption of files smaller than 1MB. This meant that it was still acting as a destructor for large files (such as photos or videos) on the unfortunate victim’s system.

When a file is encrypted by this newer version of Chaos, it appends an “Encryption Key” to the beginning of every encrypted file, as shown in Figure 8. This key is generated when the ransomware is created.

Figure 8: File encrypted by Chaos v3

The malware decryptor uses this key to revert the damage done by the malware, as seen in Figure 9. However, this version of the malware will still overwrite files greater than 1MB in a similar fashion to its predecessors, leaving them unrecoverable.

Figure 9: Chaos 3.0 decryptor in action

Files that are smaller than 1MB are passed to the function “EncryptFile,” as shown in Figure 10, which successfully uses AES-256 to encrypt files.

Figure 10: Chaos v3.0 encryption routine

Chaos 4.0 / Onyx

With the author still hellbent on refining their creation, Chaos v4.0 was soon released. Like previous editions of Chaos Builder, malware produced by the “Chaos Ransomware Builder v4” shows improvements over Chaos 3.0 samples, specifically when it came to use of the AES/RSA encryption routine shown in Figure 10.

These advancements allowed the builder to create ransomware that could successfully handle encrypting slightly larger files – up to 2.1MB in size. Unfortunately, larger files were still overwritten and destroyed.

Chaos 4.0 added the following functionality (shown in Figure 11):

  • Ability to change the victim’s desktop wallpaper
  • Customizable file-extension lists
  • Better encryption compatibility

Figure 11: Chaos v4.0 panel

Though Chaos v4.0 had been in-the-wild for several months now, this variant of Chaos rose to notoriety in April 2022 when it was weaponized by a threat group called Onyx.

This particular threat group would infiltrate a victim organization’s network, steal any valuable data it found, then would unleash “Onyx ransomware,” their own branded creation based on Chaos Builder v4.0. To verify this, we’ve performed tests on samples dubbed Onyx ransomware, and there was a 98% match to a test sample generated via Chaos v4.0.

The Onyx group simply customized their ransom note and created a refined list of file extensions they wished to target. There is little other modification to differentiate it from any other samples built with Chaos v4.0.

Onyx Customized File-Extension List

.txt

.jar

.dat

.contact

.settings

.doc

.docx

.xls

.xlsx

.ppt

.pptx

.odt

.mka

.mhtml

.oqy

.png

.csv

.py

.sql

.mdb

.php

.asp

.aspx

.html

.htm

.xml

.psd

.pdf

.xla

.cub

.dae

.indd

.cs

.mp3

.mp4

.dwg

.zip

.rar

.mov

.rtf

.bmp

.mkv

.avi

.apk

.dib

.dic

.dif

.divx

.iso

.7zip

.ace

.arj

.bz2

.cab

.gzip

.lzh

.tar

.jpeg

.xz

.mpeg

.torrent

.mpg

.core

.pdb

.ico

.pas

.db

.wmv

.swf

.cer

.bak

.backup

.accdb

.bay

.p7c

.exif

.vss

.raw

.m4a

.wma

.flv

.sie

.sum

.ibank

.wallet

.css

.js

.rb

.crt

.xlsm

.xlsb

.7z

.cpp

.java

.jpe

.ini

.blob

.wps

.docm

.wav

.3gp

.webm

.m4v

.amv

.m4p

.svg

.ods

.bk

.vdi

.vmdk

.onepkg

.accde

.jsp

.json

.gif

.log

.gz

.config

.vb

.m1v

.sln

.pst

.obj

.xlam

.djvu

.inc

.cvs

.dbf

.tbi

.wpd

.dot

.dotx

.xltx

.pptm

.potx

.potm

.pot

.xlw

.xps

.xsd

.xsf

.xsl

.kmz

.accdr

.stm

.accdt

.ppam

.pps

.ppsm

.1cd

.3ds

.3fr

.3g2

.accda

.accdc

.accdw

.adp

.ai

.ai3

.ai4

.ai5

.ai6

.ai7

.ai8

.arw

.ascx

.asm

.asmx

.avs

.bin

.cfm

.dbx

.dcm

.dcr

.pict

.rgbe

.dwt

.f4v

.exr

.kwm

.max

.mda

.mde

.mdf

.mdw

.mht

.mpv

.msg

.myi

.nef

.odc

.geo

.swift

.odm

.odp

.oft

.orf

.pfx

.p12

.pl

.pls

.safe

.tab

.vbs

.xlk

.xlm

.xlt

.xltm

.svgz

.slk

.tar.gz

.dmg

.ps

.psb

.tif

.rss

.key

.vob

.epsp

.dc3

.iff

.onetoc2

.opt

.p7b

.pam

.r3d

.dsn

.dmp

.qbw

.imr

.nd

.chw

.spi

.ep

.tlg

.qbb

.msi

.eml

.thmx

.obi

.chm

.pub

.md5

.spf

.spk

.idx

.scc

.jdk

.cnt

.tum

.dsm

.reg

.cfg

.ldf

.bat

.dxf

.SLDDRW

.SLDPRT

.SLDASM

.mil

.dlf

.c4

.pdx

.onepkg

.url

.jpg

 

 

 

 

 

 


Unlike the default Chaos ransom note, which provided little in the way of instructions or guidance to affected victims, the group behind Onyx implemented a leak site called “Onyx News,” hosted via an Onion page on the anonymous Tor network. Onyx used it to give victims more information on how to recover their data.

The ransom note for Onyx (seen below in Figure 12) gave the address, login and password credentials that enabled the victim to logon and engage in a discussion with the threat actors behind the ransomware attack. This conversation usually led to the malware operator demanding a fee of Bitcoin cryptocurrency to release the decryptor key to the victim.    

Figure 12: Onyx Ransom note

The threat actors behind Onyx would post a list of victims of their attacks. The leak site included information about their victims, along with publicly viewable stolen data (as seen in Figure 13).

Figure 13: Onyx leak site

As one might expect, Onyx suffered from many of the same flaws as other “ransomware” generated by Chaos v4.0. For example, it would only encrypt smaller files, while rendering larger files unrecoverable.

Chaos 5.0/Yashma

Chaos Ransomware Builder v5.0 was released in early 2022, once again built on the foundation of the previous version, Chaos v4.0. Chaos 5.0 attempted to resolve the largest problem of previous iterations of the threat, namely that it was unable to encrypt files larger than 2MB without irretrievably corrupting them.

Figure 14: Comparisons between Chaos v5.0 and Yashma

This version of Chaos encrypts victim files with AES-256, and then appends a key to the end of each file to signify they’ve been encrypted. This key is then used by the newly designed decryptor to decode the files, returning them to their original, unencrypted state.

Customization options from Chaos v4.0 are also unchanged, which gives the threat actor the following options:

  • Create a custom ransom note
  • Run on startup
  • Drop the malware as a different process
  • Sleep prior to execution
  • Set desktop wallpaper
  • Encrypt specific file-extensions
  • Disrupt recovery systems
  • Propagate the malware over network connections
  • Choose a custom encryption file-extension
  • Disable the Windows® task manager

Though slower to complete its malicious tasks on the victim device than when it was simply destroying files, the malware finally operates as expected, with files of all sizes being properly encrypted by the malware and retaining the potential to be restored to their former unencrypted state.

Figure 15: Advances from Chaos 4.0 to Chaos 5.0 to Yashma samples

After the release of Chaos Ransomware Builder v5, its sixth iteration had yet another re-branding, this time being renamed Yashma.

Though few instances of Yashma had been found in-the-wild at the time of writing this blog, the malware operates nearly identically to its Chaos v5.0 counterpart. The “Yashma” version has just two advancements added to differentiate itself from previous iterations.

It now has functionality to prevent it from running based on the victim’s location, determined via the language set on the victim device. This is a ploy often used by threat actors to avoid legal trouble in their country of origin.

The malware can now also stop various services on the victim device. Based on our analysis of Yashma samples taken from the wild, these are the services we’ve seen the updated malware target:

  • Antivirus (AV) solutions
  • Vault services
  • Backup services
  • Storage services
  • Remote Desktop services
     

Service Name

Product

BackupExecAgentBrowser

Veritas Open Exchange

BackupExecDiveciMediaService

Veritas

BackupExecJobEngine

Veritas

BackupExecManagementService

Veritas

vss

Volume Shadow Copy

sql

Structured Query Language

svc$

 

memtas

MailEnable

sophos

Sophos

veeam

Veeam Software

backup

Generic match for any service with backup in the name

GxVss

Commvault

GxBlr

Commvault

GxFWD

Commvault

GxCVD

Commvault

GxCIMgr

Commvault

DefWatch

Norton AntiVirus

ccEvtMgr

Norton AntiVirus

SavRoam                     

Symantec AntiVirus

RTVscan

Symantec Internet Security

QBFCService

QuickBooks

Intuit.QuickBooks.FCS

QuickBooks

YooBackup

Wooxo Yoo Backup

YooIT

Wooxo Yoo Backup

zhudongfangyu

360 Safe Guard

sophos

Sophos

stc_raw_agent

StorageCraft Volume Snapshot

VSNAPVSS

StorageCraft Volume Snapshot

QBCFMonitorService

Intuit Quickbooks

VeeamTransportSvc

Veeam Software

VeeamDeploymentService

Veeam Software

VeeamNFSSvc

Veeam Software

veeam

Veeam Software

PDVFSService

Veritas

BackupExecVSSProvider

Veritas

BackupExecAgentAccelerator

Veritas

BackupExecRPCService

Veritas

AcrSch2Svc

Acronis

AcronisAgent

Acronis

CASAD2DWebSvc

ArcServe

CAARCUpdateSvc

ArcServe

TeamViewer

TeamView

 

Conclusion

Chaos (and subsequently Yashma) have seen rapid development and advances throughout the last year, with its most recent iteration, “Yashma” (Chaos v6.0), found in-the-wild in mid-2022.

Chaos started as a relatively basic attempt at a .NET compiled ransomware that instead functioned as a file-destructor or wiper. Over time it has evolved to become a full-fledged ransomware, adding additional features and functionality with each iteration.

What makes Chaos/Yashma dangerous going forward is its flexibility and its widespread availability. As the malware is initially sold and distributed as a malware builder, any threat actor who purchases the malware can replicate the actions of the threat group behind Onyx, developing their own ransomware strains and targeting chosen victims.

This makes tracking ransomware attacks attributed to Chaos quite difficult, as Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) can change with each sample a malware builder produces. Additionally, even the most novice threat actors can find links to releases and leaks of this threat on either dark web forums or third-party malware repositories, and then use Chaos/Yashma to carry out future malicious activities.

Who is Affected?

Variants of Chaos have been seen in-the-wild for a year now, and are likely used by multiple threat actors.

Often, victims are being targeted using Onyx (based on Chaos v4.0), with the latest attacks affecting U.S.-based services and industries including:

  • Emergency Services
  • Medical
  • Finance
  • Building
  • Agriculture

Mitigation Tips

In order to avoid becoming a victim of Choas/Yashma:

  • Keep updated backups in case of data destruction, file-loss or file-corruption.
  • Have a ransomware business continuity plan ready to be put into action.
  • Avoid and report suspicious links and files.

YARA Rule

The following YARA rule was authored by the BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team to catch the threat described in this document:

import "pe"    

    rule Mal_Win32_ChaosRansomware_2022
{            
    meta:
    description = "Detects Ransomware Built by Chaos Ransomware Builder"
    author = "BlackBerry Threat Research"
    date = "2022-05-10"
    license = "This Yara rule is provided under the Apache License 2.0 (https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0) and open to any user or organization, as long as you use it under this license and ensure originator credit in any derivative to The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team"

    strings:
        //Ransom References
        $x1 = "Encrypt" ascii wide
        $x2 = "(?:[13]{1}[a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{26,33}|bc1[a-z0-9]{39,59})" ascii wide
        $x3 = "read" ascii wide        

        //Ransom Hex
        $r1 = { 20 76 69 72 75 73 }
        $r2 = { 72 00 61 00 6e 00 73 00 6f 00 6d 00 77 00 61 00 72 00 65 }

        //Shadow Copy Delete
        $z0 = "deleteShadowCopies" ascii wide
        $z1 = "shadowcopy" ascii wide

      condition:

        //PE File
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and

        // Must be less than
        filesize < 35KB and

        // Must have exact import hash
        pe.imphash() == "f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744" and

        //Number of sections
        pe.number_of_sections == 3 and

        //These Strings
        ((all of ($x*)) and (1 of ($r*)) and (1 of ($z*)))

 

}

____________________________________________________________________________________________
 

import "pe"    

    rule Mal_Win32_Onyx_Strain_Chaos_Ransomware_2022
{           
    meta:
    description = "Detects Onyx Ransomware build off of Chaos Builder v4"
    author = "BlackBerry Threat Research"
    date = "2022-05-10"
    license = "This Yara rule is provided under the Apache License 2.0 (https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0) and open to any user or organization, as long as you use it under this license and ensure originator credit in any derivative to The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team"

            strings:
            $s1 = "(?:[13]{1}[a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{26,33}|bc1[a-z0-9]{39,59})" wide
            $s2 = "All of your files are currently encrypted by ONYX strain." wide
            $s3 = "Inform your supervisors and stay calm!" wide

            condition:

            //PE File
            uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and

            //Directories
            pe.data_directories[pe.IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR].size != 0 and

            //All strings
            all of ($s*)

}

____________________________________________________________________________________________


import "pe"    

    rule Mal_Win32_Chaos_Builder_Ransomware_2022
{           
    meta:
    description = "Detects Chaos Ransomware Builder"
    author = "BlackBerry Threat Research"
    date = "2022-05-10"
    license = "This Yara rule is provided under the Apache License 2.0 (https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0) and open to any user or organization, as long as you use it under this license and ensure originator credit in any derivative to The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team"

            strings:

                        $s0 = "1qw0ll8p9m8uezhqhyd" ascii wide

                        $s1 = "Chaos Ransomware Builder" ascii wide

                        $s2 = "payloadFutureName" ascii wide

                        $s3 = "read_it.txt" ascii wide

                        $s4 = "encryptedFileExtension" ascii wide

 

                        $x0 = "1098576" ascii wide

                        $x1 = "2197152" ascii wide

            condition:

//PE File

                        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and

 

                        //All strings

                        ((all of ($s*)) and (1 of ($x*)))


}

 

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Appended file extension:

  • .[a-z][A-Z]{4} (default)

Registry Addition:

RegKey Add:
SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\Run

  • Key: Microsoft Store
  • Value: %Current Path/Location%

Mutex:

  • 1qw0ll8p9m8uezhqhyd

Files Dropped:

  • %AppData%\Roaming\svchost.exe


RYUK .NET Builder

Name

Example SHA256

Builder v1

0d8b4a07e91e02335f600332644e8f0e504f75ab19899a58b2c85ecb0887c738

Ransomware v1

f41962f51583d08ed7ca796b125f2300e03035b8790590e8e2d036f53bd9be79

 

Chaos 2.0+

Name

Example SHA256

Builder v2

325dfac6172cd279715ca8deb280eefe3544090f1583a2ddb5d43fc7fe3029ed

Ransomware v2

202e6f0501abaf85b5c53bafcd70e31aa20e65c140f13b15d45e60c00b0413c0

 

Chaos 3.0+

Name

Example SHA256

Builder v3

a98bc2fcbe8b3c7ea9df3712599a958bae0b689ae29f33ee1848af7a038d518a

Ransomware v3

1d71add7ecfe9be642a84d080dfbc4b602a0f49239938a337c7c860eb7edf3fe

Decryptor v3

31c783b0211bf4b72f10b6dac6f933b7aba570ff7a8c608fd8eb46311aec0091

 

Chaos 4.0+

Name

Example SHA256

Builder v4

392a3adb44ab2640290f88f751d7608bc66a1c7df845fa1d0baa0aea78ac7a49
f3432c74402aa36468d6641d5ccc15c1e0ceb083bc0f7e73d2b5dbfa0cfb9974

Ransomware v4 77f3cddd3cb245b2645b4885ebf2080f7c23f7101f4c3ce27239ea0326a8fcc5

Decryptor v4

fac94a8e02f92d63cfdf1299db27e40410da46c9e86d8bb2cd4b1a0d68d5f7a2

 

Chaos 5.0+

Name

Example SHA256

Builder v5

6562f92ba9d4784bf30e87681e538e0f7b8eff26811ace6be8970b0a8e3e3ca0

Ransomware v5

7a7f9b043b83184a537e09b76b811546d3032c776246d28ae0e4f6ca5f9f92b8

Decryptor v5

8f236217c4e280b4950cedccbc6bbd03f31902525a7f9fe98b6de5bb50787cfb

 

References

BlackBerry Assistance

If you’re battling this malware or a similar threat, you’ve come to the right place, regardless of your existing BlackBerry relationship.

The BlackBerry Incident Response team is made up of world-class consultants dedicated to handling response and containment services for a wide range of incidents, including ransomware and Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) cases.

We have a global consulting team standing by to assist you, providing around-the-clock support where required, as well as local assistance. Please contact us here: https://www.blackberry.com/us/en/forms/cylance/handraiser/emergency-incident-response-containment

Related Reading:

 

The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team

About The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team

The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence team examines emerging and persistent threats, providing intelligence analysis for the benefit of defenders and the organizations they serve.